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Assistance Administration to Columbia University.AN ANALYSIS OF FIRM DEMAND FOR PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME
Ann P. Bartel*
It is well known that as a result of spiralling crime rates, public
expenditures for police protection have been risinci at a rapid rate. It
is less well known, however, that private expenditures for quards, pro-
tective services and equipment have kept pace with the increasing public
expenditures. The data in Table 1 show that durin the 1960's per capita
private protection expenditures and per capita public protection expendi-
tures both rose by 75 per cent in constant dollars. Despite the fact
that in 1970 the private sector allocated at least $3.3 billion of its
resources to protection,1 and this sum is two—thirds the size of the
corresponding public outlay no one has explicitly analyzed the deter-
minants of the private sector's demand for protection.2
*
AssistantProfessor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Re-
search Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. I would like to
thank Professor William Landes for his valuable suggestions and criticisms
and Professor Jacob Mincer for his helpful comments. Partial financial support was
provided by a grant (No. 73-NI-99-1005) from the Manpower Development
Assistance Division of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to
Columbia University.
'Total private orotection expenditures are certainly underestimated
by the fiiures in Table 1 since a complete measure of private outlays
would include the cost of substituting taxi rides for subway trips,
keeping lights on at night, staying home after dark, etc.
2Three other research projects that analyzed private protection but
did not estimate derand functions are J. Kakalik and S. Wildhorn,
Private Police in the United States, The Rand Corporation, 1971; Neil
Komesar, 'A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Victims of Crime,'
Journl of Legal Studies, Volume 2, June 1973; and Tim Ozenne, 'The
Economics of sank Robbery," Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 3,
January 1974.—2—
TABLE 1
Per Capita Amounts of Public and Private
Outlays for Protection
1960 1970
Public police protection 11.28 24.50
Constant dollarsa (10.94) (19.19)
Private guards, protective
services and equipment 7.33 16.20
Constant dollarsa (7.11) (12.69)
a195759 =100.
Sources: Public expenditure data for 1960 are from
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics on
Governmental Finances and Employment, 1967 Census of
Governments, Volume 6, 1969.
Public expenditure data for 1970 are from
U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Expenditure and Employment
Data for the Criminal Justice System: 1970—71, 1973.
Private expenditure data are from J. Kakalik
and S. Wildhorn, Private Police in the United States,
The Rand Corporation, Volume 2, 1971.
This article, which summarizes a larqer study, 3attempts to fill this
gap by considering firm demand for protection. Since about 85 per cent of
total private security spendinq is by firms an analysis that concentrates
solely on firms explains almost all of the private sector's security
3See Ann P. Bartel, "The Demand for Private Protection," Ph.D. disser-
tation, Columbia University, Department of Economics, 1974.—3—
outlays. The main purpose of this article is to answer three questions.
One, how is firm demand for protection related to business losses from
crime and the probability of crime? Two, are public and private expendi—
tures substitutes or complements? Three, does a firm choose self-
protection as a substitute for market insurance or will it spend more on
protection if it has insurance?
Part I describes a theoretical framework for analyzing a firm's
protection decisions. In Part II I discuss the data set that is used
to test the model and the methods of proxying some of the unobserved
theoretical variables. Part III presents the results of the empirical
analysis. In Part IV the data are used to test what factors, holdinq




A firm's decision to purchase protective services and/or market in-
surance can be analyzed within the context of the "state preference"
approach to behavior under uncertainty. Ehrlich and Becker have developed
an expected utility model within this context to analyze protection and
insurance decisions of individuals.4 In what follows I apply their basic
framework to firms but make several important extensions on their model.
4See I. Ehrlich and G. S. Becker, "Market Insurance, Self—Insurance,
and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, \olume 80, July 1972.
.—4—
The firm is assumed to produce an output X using two inputs: M,
which is hired labor measured in manhours, and T ,whichis the entre-
preneur's time.5 For simplicity, X is assumed to be produced according
to a Cobb—Douglas decreasing returns to scale production function:
cx 8 X =AMT where a +8<1 (1) m
The firm is also assumed to be subject to the possibility of losses
from crimes such as burglary, robbery, vandalism, shoplifting and employee
theft. These losses will be denoted L (a composite loss) where L (meas-
ured in dollars) is a function of factors that are exogenous to the firm
as well as being a function of the size of output:
L =L(Le, X) (2)
Le, the so-called endowed or exoqenous loss is determined, by among
other things, the firm's industry group and its location (i.e. urban vs.
nonurban). Type of industry can affect Le in one of two ways: the ease
with which merchandise can be transported and the accessibility of the
merchandise. For example, a bank would have a higher Le than a manufac-
turing plant of the same size since banks hold a larger inventory of
have ignored the obvious third input, capital, because I primarily
wish to emphasize the market—nonmarket dichotomy between certain inputs
in the production process. To the extent that I am dealing with short-
run decisions by the firm, capital could be treated as a fixed factor
and need not enter the short—run production function.—5—
cash; while the cash is not readily accessible, it is easily transportable
once the criminal has access to it and this would enable him to steal a
larger dollar amount from a bank than from a manufacturing plant for any
given criminal action against these two firms. Alternatively, if one
compared a retailer with a service firm of the same size one would expect
the retailer to have a higher Le since his output is readily accessible to
customers, employees, and burglars, whereas the output of a service firm
is usually not a tangible item. The effect of location onLe is less
clear. An urban firm might have a higher Le than a nonurban firm since
the high population density of urban areas would result in an urban
criminal being more likely to take the risk of stealing a larger amount
than a nonurban one because he could be less easily detected.
It should be noted that I am assuming that type of industry and
location are fixed for the short-run decisions of the firm which I am
analyzing. ofcourse,in the long run the firm could affect Le by
moving to a new neighborhood or changing the nature of its business.
X, the size of output, has a positive effect on L since the more
the firm produces the larger its potential losses. While protection
expenditures can reduce the probability of a loss they are assumed not
to reduce the size of the loss.6 This relationship enables me to
6For example, the main function of a security quard is to deter a
criminal frQm attempting to steal from the firm. However, once the crime
takes place, the presence of the guard will have little effect on the
dollar amount that the criminal is actually able to remove from the store.
This distinction between protection affecting probability and not loss is
used by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). .—6—
assume that -. - = 1,a 1 per cent chance in output X results in a
1 per cent change in L and the loss—output ratio remains fixed as firrn
size increases. This is a valid assumntiori since I am merely trvina to
capture a scale effect and there is no obvious reason to assert that L
should increase either at a slower or faster rate than
The loss, L, is assumed to occur with probability, p, which is a
function of exogenous factors as well as decisions made by the firm:
p = c) (3)
is the endowment or exogenous probability and it is determined
by the firm's location and tvne of product or industry. Acain one might
expect a retailer to have a higher pe than a service firm because of the
greater availability of merchandise in a retail store. Location in an
urban area would result in a higher e because of the greater supply of
potential criminals.8 The firm can, however, change e by self-protecting.
Let c be the level of self—protection where ap/c <0and <ej c >0.
71f protection expenditures could reduceL, then the loss-output elas-
ticity would have to be greater than 1 because this elasticity is com-
puted with protection held constant. Then if the firm were to double its
output without changing its level of protection its losses would have to
increase by more than 100 per cent.
8Urban areas would have agreater supply of potential criminals than
nonurban areas because the median family income is higher in urban areas:
(continued on next page)—7—
Self—protection, c, is assumed to be produced according to a decreas-
ing return to scale productionfunction9 with two inputs: G, guard hours
purchased in the market, and T, time went by the entrepreneur policing
his firm. Thus since c, self—protection, is some function of G and T we
can write the p function as:
=(eG, T) (4)
For simplicity I have not considered the third protection input, capital,
since I am primarily interested in emphasizing the idea that an entre-






Per cent below 1/2 median 19% 20%
Source: 1970 Census of Population, General Social
and Economic Characteristics, Table 105.
Ehrlich (1973) has shown that when income inequality is held constant,
median family income has a positive effect on crime rates because it
measures the criminal's potential illegal payoff.
9Decreasing returns to scale is required by the second-order maximum
condition. See Appendix A in Bartel (1974).
.—8—
The role of the entrepreneur as a policeman can be compared to the
analysis by Aichian and Demsetz of the entrepreneur as the monitor of
team production who reduces shirking by team mernbers)0 They show that
the monitor has the incentive not to shirk as a monitor because he has
title to the net earnings of the team. Similarly, in my model, the entre-
preneur has an incentive to reduce the probability of crime against the
firm because in that way he maximizes the net earnings of his firm. Any
other non—guard employee would not have this incentive and he might in
fact try to steal from the firm.
The function in (4) has the following properties: An increase in




>0;G and T have diminishing marginal products. In addition
ap'T
it is assumed that S> 0;an increase in the number of guard—hours
reduces the marginal product of one hour of own policing time. This
occurs sLnce guards and entrepreneurial time perform essentially the
same type of protective service and the deterrent effect of an increase
in guard—hours reduces the contribution that T makes to a reduction in
°See their "Production, InformationCosts, and Economic Organization,"
AER, 62, December 1972. Their model requires the entrepreneur to spe-
cialize in monitoring whereas I view the entrepreneur as playing two roles,
that of policeman and that of production input (in this latter role he
could in fact be a monitor). Another article dealing with the entrepre-
neur's enforcement role is M. Silver and R. Auster, "Entrepreneurship,
Profit, and Limits on Firm Size," Journal of Business, 42, July 1969.—9—
p. While one could argue that the cross-partialsshould be negative (i.e.,
the marginal products increase) since the hirinq of a guard may enable the
entrepreneur to allocate his policing time more efficiently (i.e., a divi-
sion of labor effect) it seems more likely that the otposinq effect
dominates, especially as guard time is increased, since division of labor
would only be important when guard usage is firstintroduced.11 In spite
of the positive cross—partials, however, the self—protection isoquants are
still assumed to be convex.12
Given that the firm faces two states of the world, the no—loss state
and the loss state (where losses L occur), it maximizes the expected
utility of its net income prospect:
=(l—p)U (Ii) +pU(11—L)
(5)
sublect to the production function for output X in (1), the constraint on




HOne other possible source of complementarity is that the entrepre-
neur must police the guards themselves. I have, however, ignored or at
least minimized the importance of this relationship.
12Convexity is required by the second-order maximum conditions. See
Appendix A in Bartel (1974).— 10—
whereT is the total time the entrepreneur spends on the job, T is the
entrepreneur's policing time, and Tm is the time he allocates towards
producing output If initially we assume that insurance is unavail-
able to the firm, net income can be exoressed as:
Il=kX_wM_wGG
(7)
where k is the market price of the output and is assumed fixed for the
firm, w is the waqe rate of the hired input (also constant) and WG is
the wage rate of security guards (also constant for the firm).
If the firm is risk neutral it maximizes exnected profits and
equation (5) reduces to:
*kX_wM_wG_pL (8)
The firm maximizes rr* with respect to the variables it controls: M, G,
and T, subject to the four constraints. Internalizing the constraints,
the resulting first order conditions are:





is fixed because the amount of leisure and consumption time are
assumed to be previously determined.— 11—
ConditionC-i states that in equilibrium the marginal revenue from
hiring an additional manhour, M, must equal the marginal cost of hirinq
him. Note that labor is not paid the value of its marginal product
kX/M; rather there is a wedge between the wage and the VMP that is
equal to the expected loss due to hiring the extra manhour and thereby
increasing output. Condition C-2 states that the marginal revenue from
hiring an additional guard hour must equal the guard wage rate. Condi-
tion C-3 states that the marginal revenue from using an additional hour
of own policing time must equal the marginal cost of that hour. Note
that the marginal cost of own time, T, equals the value of the foregone
output X adjusted for the decrease in the expected loss due to the cut-
back in output x. Whereas the entrepreneur can purchase guard time at
constant cost, the marginal cost of T is increasing since Tm has a
diminishing marginal product and since p falls as T is increased. In
addition, since C reduces p, the price of T is not independent of the
number of guard hours the firmhires.







which states that the ratio of the marginal products of the two protection
inputs must equal the ratio of their marginal costs. This equilibrium— 12—
conditioncan be represented as in Figure 1:
T
DefermitVtnj W-€. Op+,,-noi
Guards *, Entneu.dctf 7t
L kv'4 of seIf-protedit
SinceG and T are imperfect substitutes the self-protection isoquants are
convex. The slope of the isoquant equals The transformation curve,
whose slope equals ,isnonlinear because T can not be pur—
(k-pa)
chased at constant cost. Equilibrium occurs at the tangency of an isoquant
and the transformation curve.
Equation (9) points out that guards and entrepreneural time are
asymmetric in the sense that an increase in G reduces p while an increase
in T reduces p and L. (This asymmetry has important implications for com-
parative statics predictions as will be shown below.) Another distinction
between G and T is that there may be some "lumpiness" in the hiring of
guards. For example the optimal decision for a small firm might be to
hire a guard for fifteen minutes out of every hour but contractual con-
straints would not permit this arrangement. Entrepreneurial time, on the
other hand, could be adjusted more precisely. Therefore small firms— 13—
mightbe forced to specialize and only use T to produce protection.14
B. Comparative Statics Predictions
By differentiating the first order conditions at the maximum the
effects of several exogenous factors on the amounts of G and that
are used 'can be determined. Complete explanations and proofs of these
results can be found elsewhere;15 a brief summary of the predictions
is presented here.
1. An increase in the guard wage rate results in a decrease in
the number of guard hours hired and an increase in the amount of the
entrepreneur's time used in self-protection.
2. An increase in the parameterin the production function in
(1) causes an increase in guard hours and a decrease in the entrepre-
neur's time.
3. An increase in the endowed loss results in an increase in
bothGandT.
S
4.An increase in the endowment probability will cause an in-
crease in both G and T if the increase in e raises the marginal
16
products of the two protection inputs.
14sman firms could avoid this problem by organizing in agroup which
would hire a full-time guard. Each firm could then get a few minutes
out of every hour of the guard's time. An alternative solution may be
to hire a guard just for a few key hours out of every day.
'5See Bartel (1974), Chapter II and Appendix A.
161f the marginal products of G and T are unchanged then we have
dT S
—->0because the marginal cost of T falls (see condition C-3) and
dp
S
(continuedon next page)— 14—
5.An increase in public protection expenditures will reduce G
and,T if their marginal products fall as a result of the increased
level of public protection.
6. If an increase in the education of guards raises their marginal
productivities, then holding WG constant, this will result in an increase
in G and a decrease in T
S
7.An increase in the entrepreneur's experience will cause an
increase in G and a decrease in T if experience has a relatively larger
effect on the entrepreneur's marginal product in output production than
on his marginal product in protection.
17
ax




dG—<0because losses fall since M and T are reduced and the marginal e m dp
product of C falls because T rises. I am postulating that the guards
and entrepreneurial time that are currently employed should become more
valuable after an exogenous increase in the crime rate. The protection
inputs would have a higher marginal product, the higher the initial o
since,it is easier to reduce the probability from, for example, .8 to .7
than it is to reduce it from .5 to .4. Diagrammatically this could be






If T increases then G will fall because C's marginal product falls and
because losses fall as a result of the decrease in T
m.— 15—
Inthe expected utility literature it is often noted that a 1 per
cent change th Le has the same, larger or smaller percentage effect on
expected utility as does a 1 per cent change in e according to whether
the individual is risk neutral, risk averse or a risk preferrer; hence
the deterrent effect on a criminal of a 1 per cent increase in the prob-
ability of apprehension exceeds, equals, or falls short of the effect of
a 1 percent increase in the fine according to whether he is a risk
preferrer, risk neutral, or a riskavoider)8 A similar test can be
applied to the protection response of firms to an increase in Le and
e
an increase in p .Inmy model, even though firms are assumed to be
risk neutral, a 1 per cent change in Le has a larger percentage effect
on G than does a 1 per cent change in e19 The reason for this is that
when the increase in e takes place, the firm can maximize expected
profits not only by hiring G, but also by hiring fewer M and thereby
18See Gary S. Becker (1968) and Issac Ehrlich (1973) for proofs of
this result.
19See Bartel (1974), Appendix A for proof. Note I assume there that




EPe rises relative toSELe and euality or even EPe >EL
could result.
Since I have no prior information on the size of'G
assuming
ap
it to be equal to one is the most neutral assumption.— 16—
reducinglosses. Since the loss itself is endogenous the firm has another
alternative when e rises; this alternative is usually ignored in the
standard expected utility models.
In the case of the entrepreneur's time, if the loss is completely
exogenous, a 1 per cent increase in Le will have the same relative effect
on T as will a 1 per cent increase in e the usual risk neutral result.
ut since my model treats the loss as endogenous, risk neutrality results
in a 1 per cent increase in Le having a smaller relative effect on T than
does a 1 per cent increase in pe• This is because the increase in
reduces the marginal cost of T thus causing a further expansion of T
20
beyond that of the case of an exogenous loss.
C. Risk Aversion and the Availability of Insurance
If the assumption of risk neutrality is relaxed such that the firm's
utility function now has a negative second derivative then the firm maxi-
mizes the utility function in (5).Introducinginsurance into themodel
requiresthe insurance premium, q, to be subtracted from I, income in
state one, and the quantity A-qto be added to income in state zero where
Ais the amount of insurance the firm purchases and q =ApA.If insur-
ance is actuarially fair, A =1,and all the predictions derived above
hold since the firm acts as if it were risk neutral.
20Although M is reduced when e rises and this lowers L, CT,Pe is
not reduced because the reduction in M also lowers the marginal cost of
T and these two factors are perfectly offsetting:
d(C-3) L X =0because—— = 1.— 17—
Theeffect of insurance on the demand for guards and entrepreneurial
time is unclear. An increase in A reduces the net loss to the firmand
the marginal gain from self-protecting either via C or T diminishes.
This is the source of the moral hazard problem; if a firm has loss cover-
age it has no incentive to reduce the probability of the loss occurring.
On the other hand, an increase in G or T reduces the price of insurance
since p falls and q =ApA,thereby implying a complementary relationship
between protection and insurance. However one would expect to observe a
stronger complementary relationship between guards and insurance than
between entrepreneur's policing time and insurance because there is an
additional negative relationship between T and A that does not exist
for G and A; that is, an increase in T reduces L since output falls
and the reduction in L lowers the demand for insurance.
D. Industry Equilibrium
The model described above considered the reactions of a single firm
in a competitive industry to losses from various crimes. One of the basic
assumptions of the model was that the firm could not affect the price of
its output. Althouqh crime increased the firm's costs the firm reached
an equilibrium by producing that output where its new marginal cost
equalled the fixed market nrice. However, as discussed in Section A, all
firms in a particular industry in a given location will be faced with a
certain amount of crime as described by the variables e and Le. Since
all of these firms will face higher marginal cost curves as a result of
.— 18—
crimethe industry supply curve will shift to the left and the market price
will rise. Of course if one firm in the industry is especially vulnerable
to crime it may be forced out of business since the leftward shift in its
marginal cost curve will outweigh the increase in the market price; the
intersection of its marginal cost curve and its horizontal demand curve
may only occur at an output of zero units.
Since firms in different industries in a particular location and
firms in a single industry in varying locations will face different
endowed losses and endowed probabilities one would expect to observe
changes in relative prices across these groups. For example, if over
time, crime against retailers increases relative to crime against service
firms, then one should observe an increase over time in the price of re-
tail goods relative to the price of services, holding location and other
shift factors (e.g., technological change) constant. Alternatively, if
crime against urban firms increases over time relative to crime against
nonurban firms then one should observe an increase over time in the price
of retail goods in urban areas relative to the price of retail goods in
nonurban areas.
Similar predictions would hold in the cross-section. Using data
on industries in a given location and choosing one industry as the
nuzneraire, a regression of industry price on demand factors and supply
factors should yield positive siqns on the independent variables meas-
uring the probability of crime in the industry and the endowed loss in
the industry.— 19—
E.Reaction of Offenders
The model as developed up until this point is still only a partial
equilibrium model. It is a model of how firms react to the possibility
of losses from various crimes and describes how market prices are affected
by crime. One assumption of the model was that if a crime took place, a
firm would lose $L where L was determined by Le, a set of exogenous fac-
tors, and X, size of output. Each firm, therefore, had a specific L.
Why is it that the market can tolerate loss differentials across firms?
The answer lies in the fact that the offender's cost of committing a crime
will differ across firms. In evaluating possible targets, the offender
considers a net return function for each firm:
N. =(1—f.)L. —R.—f.F. (10)
1 11 11 1
whereL. is the gain to the criminal if he successfully carries out the
crime, f. is the probability of his being apprehended, R. is his resource
costs in perpetrating the crime, and F. is the punishment for committing
the crime. For simt1icity I assume that all offenders have equal
productivities so that every offender has the identical net return for
.th . 21
the ifirm.
The firm is able to raise f. and R. by self-protecting. If the
entrepreneur hires a guard and/or spends his own time policing, the
21T. Ozenne (1974) also makes this assumption in developing his gen-
eral eguilibrium model of theft and protection.
.— 20—
probabilityof a criminal being apprehended in his store increases and
moreover, the criminal may have to engage more of his own resources in
order to successfully commit a crime in this store. The entrepreneur
has the incentive to increase f. and R. because this will reduce the
1 1
probability of a crime being committed against his firm and expected
profits will thereby increase. Also, he can reduce L. by cuttinq back
on his output. F. is presumably out of the entrepreneur's control
since it would be decided by public officials.
Then, in order for the market to tolerate loss differentials
across firms, net returns to crime must be equalized across firms.
This implies that, in the cross—section, the occurrence of higher
losses, L., should be associated with hiqher exnected punishments and - --
highercriminal resource costs.
II. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Data limitations make it impossible to test all of the implications
of the theoretical model. The market equilibrium conditions discussed
in Sections D and E of Part I are not considered in the empirical work.
Moreover only those comparative statics predictions outlined in Sections
B and C of Part I that deal with the demand for guards are tested here.
A. The Data
The data set used to test some of the implications of the theoretical
model is the Small Business Administration's 1968 Survey of Crime Against— 21—
Business.22While the survey was performed by the Small Business Adminis-
tration, it should be pointed out that the survey was not limited to small
businesses; in fact annual gross receipts for the firms included in the
sample ranged from under $10,000 to over $10,000,000. The survey was
designed to measure business losses from various crimes and protection
decisions and expenditures by individual firms. The sample of firms was
selected from corporate and business tax returns for fiscal years ending
between July 1, 1965 and June 30, 1966. After excluding returns filed
for agriculture, forestry, and fishery businesses, the sample was
stratified by type of business ownership and by size of business receipts.
A self—weighted 1 in 1,400 sample was then selected; however, only 50 per
cent of the businesses were actually interviewed in the summer of 1968
resulting in a final group of approximately 2,450 firms. I reduced the
sample to 1,941 firms because many firms failed to provide information
on their losses and protection expenditures.
The crime cateqories included in the survey were shoplifting,
burglary, robbery, vandalism, and employee theft.23 The Small Business
Administration asked each firm to give dollar amounts for each of the
above types of loss that it incurred during the twelve—month period
22See U.S. Small Business Administration, "Crime Against Small Busi-
ness," a Report Transmitted to the U.S. Senate, U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1969, for a complete description of the survey.
23The firms were also questioned about their losses from bad checks
but I excluded these losses.22 —
priorto the date of the interview, i.e., between July 1967 and July
1968.24 Table 2 shows the distribution of the reported losses broken
down by type of loss and location of firm.Therelatively low loss
figures in lines 1 and 4 are explained by the fact that many firms ex-
perienced no losses at all. 2mong those firms with a loss, however,
the averaqe loss for urban firms was $1,400 while for nonurban firms
it was $600. While urban firms incurred laraer losses than nonurban
firms in every category the distribution of the total losses into the
separate categories differs by location. Burglary and vandalism com-
prise 64 per cent of urban losses but represent only 51 per cent of
nonurban losses; employee theft and shoplifting account for only 33
per cent of urban losses but they comprise 46 per cent of nonurhan
losses.
B. Demand for Guards Equation
The basic reduced form equation from Part I which will be tested
on the Small Business Administration data is as follows:
Guards =a+
b1Endowed Loss +b2Endowed Probability
+
b3Public Protection +b4Wage of Guards
(11)
+
b5Education of Guards +b6Experience of
Entrepreneurs +b7Insurance +u
24The firms actually picked a loss interval into which their loss fell.
I used the midpoint of the interval to measure the actual loss value. For
the open-ended intervals arbitrary values were used but very few firms had










1. Average losses 131.33 234.3116.35 215.50 102.74 700.17
2. Fraction of
firms with
a loss .14 .18 .04 .33 .08 .50
3. Averagelosses
forthose firms
witha loss 931.421,316.35441.89 657.011,252.931,397.54
Nonurban
4. Average losses 60.13 59.74 4.42 49.73 38.54212.59
5. Fraction of
firmswith
a loss .14 .10 .01 .21 .06 .36
6. Average losses
for thosefirms
witha loss 438.91 597.40315.71 239.09 688.21 593.83
.— 24—
Theempirical proxies of the theoretical variables re discussed below.
C. Dependent Variables
The SBA asked each firm whether or not it (a) employed a guard or
watchman or hired a guard throuch a security auard service, or (b) sub-
scribed to a protective service. Firms that did subscribe to a protec-
tive service were asked to give the monthly fee they paid for this
service. The difference between a guard or watchman and a protective
service is in the amount and type of protection each provides. A guard
is assigned to patrol a store for a specified period of time. Hence,
if he works for a retailer during the day, he is able to reduce the prob-
ability of shoplifting, employee theft and robbery. If he is a night
watchman for a manufacturing plant his primary responsibility is to re-
duce the probability of burglary and vandalism. If a firm subscribes
to a protective service, however, it does not aet full—time protection
from a guard or watchman. Rather a group of firms, in ore neighborhood,
hires a guard service to patrol the entire area and each individual firm,
therefore, may receive only a few minutes of actual protection out of
every hour that the guard is on duty in the neighborhood. Since a pro-
tective service patrols outside the store and usually at night, the
service is primarily aimed at reducing the probability of burglary and
vandalism. The average monthly expenditures for these protective services
is approximately $50. Moreover, 7 per cent of the firms in the sample re-
ported subscribing to a protective service while 6 per cent reported that
they had a guard.— 25—
Sincethe SBA survey made the above distinction between the two
types of guard service, I was able to test the model in Part I using
two dependent variables. Unfortunately, the data only enabled me to
approximate the number of guards by a dummy variable (GD) which eauals
one if the firm has a guard and zero if it does not. The presence or




1. Estimate of the endowed loss (L
The model in Part I assumes that the firm has some subjective
measure of Le, the dollar loss that it will incur qiven that a crime
takes place and also ignoring scale effects (i.e., the effect of size
of output on absolute losses). Le was assumed to be determined by
the type of industry and location of the firm. The empirical specif i-
cation in equation (11) requires that a dollar figure be assigned to
each firm to measure its Le. I assume that the.thfirm decides what
its is by looking at the recent loss experience of other firms that
have similar industry and location characteristics. The th firm looks
at the losses experienced by these firms in the previous twelve months
and uses this information to predict what it thinks its own Le will be
for the coming period. In other words, if firms in the surrounding
neighborhood (or in the same industry) have been experiencing very high
losses, (when a crime takes place), the th firm in that neighborhood
.— 26—
(industry)realizes that it faces a high Le and it will be more likely to
hire a guard than a firm in a neighborhood (industry) with a low Le. It
is not important that the 1th firm might have had the guard during the
past year; what matters is that it currently has a guard and this is in
part determined by its estimation of the losses it thinks it will incur
in the next few months if a crime is committed against the firm.
The estimation of Le requires grouping the firms in the sample into
cells of "similar" firms. I used two grouping methods. For the first
method, the firms were stratified by industry group (nine categories),
urban/nonurban, and three size categories (gross sales less than
$50,000, between $50,000 and $500,000, and greater than $500,000), re-
sulting in fifty-four cells. Although the theoretical model describes
Le as being unrelated to size of firm, I used the three broad size
categories because there was a tremendous range in the sizes of the
firmsin the sample and it seemed unreasonable to assume that an urban
grocery store with $10,000 gross sales would gain any information from
the loss experience of an urban department store with $1,000,000 gross
sales.Size, however, is really not held constant in the construction
of Le since within each of the three categories there is still much size
variation.
The second grouping method is to stratify by geographic region of
the country(nine regions),urban/nonurban, and the three size cells.
Thismethod is not as attractive as thefirstone since it is unlikely
that a retailer in a certain area would usethe losses of a bank(in— 27—
thesame area) as a measure of its own endowed loss; but stratifying by
industry, region, urban and size was impossible because too many small
cells would be produced.
After the firms were appropriately grouped, Le was computed by
taking the mean loss in the twelve—month period of those firms in the
cell that had a positive loss. The five types of losses were added
together in computing this variable
The above argument assumes that the th firm relies on the loss
experience of similar firms in predicting its endowed loss. It is, of
course, possible that if the 1th firm itself experienced a very high
loss during the previous twelve months then the average loss of the
other firms may be an underestimate of this firm's Le for the coming
period. On the other hand, a high loss during one particular twelve-
month period could be due to special random events in that period and,
therefore, the th firm's actual loss last year may provide no infor-
mation for its future losses. One could therefore express Le as:
Le =+(La—) (12)
where L is the mean loss in the firm's cell, La is its actual loss and
S1is an adjustment coefficient that lies between zero and one. Infor-
mation on La is, of course, only obtained for those firms (40 per cent
of the sample) that had a positive loss during the twelve-month period.
Also La embodies the scale effect of output on L and size of firm must
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thereforebe held constant in the regression. Of course the importance of
a $1,000 deviation will probably differ if L is $500 or $5,000 and there-
fore a more useful way of incorporating the firm's own loss is to consider
the relative deviation of its dollar loss, i.e.
Le=L+l(LL)
(13)
L (LOSS), and the expression in (13) are tested in Part III as empirical
estimates of the firm'sendowed loss.
2.Estimate of the endowed probability (re)
The two methods of grouping described above were also used to com-
pute For the th firm, an estimate of its endowment probability is
• . th the ratio of the number of firms in the ifirm's cell that reported a
loss over the total number of firms in the cell (PROS). The second
grouping method, usinq region rather than industry, may be more appro-
priate since the fact that a bank in a given area experienced a loss
indicates to a retailer in the same area that businesses in the neighbor-
hood are incurring losses from crime; the fact that a retailer in another
area experienced a loss would not provide information on the local crime
rate but would indicate that retailers are more susceptible to crime than,
for example, service firms. Therefore, both methods should provide suit-
able measures for e whereas in the case of Le the industry grouping should
be far superior to the regional grouping.
One problem with measuring e in this manner is that the actual
incidence of crime in a given cell is determined not only by endowment— 29—
factorslike industry and location but also by the protection expendi-
tures of the firms in thecell.25 Therefore if p,theincidence of
crime, in one cell is greater than pinanother cell this could in part
be due to the fact that the average protection expenditures of the firms
in the first cell are less than those of the firms in the second cell.
In order for p to measure e, the mean protection expenditures in the
cell must be held constant. The variable used to construct this mean
(AVG) is the totaléxpenditure of each firm on all protective devices
that it had purchased up until the date of the interview. Using the
average monthly expenditures on protective services would nothave been
preferable since labor is a variable factor and one cannot be sure that
these same expenditures were beinq made eight or ten months ago since
the firm could have easily adjusted its expenditures in response to
new information about future losses. While total expenditures on pro-
tective devices may also reflect responses to recent events, they do
include past expenditures, e.q., an alarm system that was installed a
few years ago, so that this variable serves as a much better control
for the level of protection during the rrevious twelve-month period.
Although the relationship between probability and protection expendi-
tures should be nonlinear (because protection has a diminishing marginal
25This problem does not occur for Le, because according to the assump-
tions of the model in Part I, protection reduces the probability of a
crime, hut once the crime ta]•:es place, it has little effect on the size
of the loss incurred.
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product),let us assume that we can express the observed probability in a
cell as:
p. = +C, (14)
where p. is the observed incidence of crime for the cTroup, C. is the
mean protection expenditures for the qroup, and 8 is neqative. If C.
equals zero then p. perfectly measures p; hence=1.8, however, is
not independent of since an increase in crime rates is assumed to raise
the marqina]. product of the nrotection inouts.26 In other words,
(15)
where A is negative since it measures the effect of orotection on nrob-
ability that is independent of the level of and y is also negative
because at a given C the slope of the p(C) function is steeper the hiqher
,eSubstituting for 8in(14) and solving for pwehave:
p.-AC
=- (16) l+y
and since the th firm's demand for guards can be written as:
G. =a+h1
e+82x (17)
See the discussion in footnote 16.— 31—








where p is measured by PROB and C is measured by AVG.
The true partial effect of e on G. is b1, but we observe the co-





Since the absolute value of yC is less than one27 the coefficient that we
observe overestimates the true effect of e on G.. This happens because
we underestimate the true difference between, for example, p and p, when
we use p and To get b1, therefore, requires iterating on different
values of y that satisfy 1 >1+yC>0.Note that equation (18) shows
(—b1
A)
that the coefficient that we observe on AVG, ,willbe positive
l+yC
since is positive and A is negative.
27Substituting (15)into(14) we have
= e
(1 +yC)+AC
Since A is negative, in order to guarantee that p. lies between 0 and 1,
the quantity 1 +1Cmustbe a positive fraction.
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Aswith the endowed loss, the firm's own experience can be used to
modify the estimate of the endowment probability as follows:
e=- XC +. POSLOS (20)
l+yC
where POSLOS eauals one if the firm had a loss durinq the previous twelve
monthsand zero if it did not. In Part IIIe
is estimated bythe
expressions in (16) and (20).
3. Public protection
The level of public molice protection in the firm's area is measured
by per capita nolice protection exnenditures by state and local aovernments
in the firm's state (PUB) for the qovernment fiscal year endinq June 30,
1968.28 In order to correctly measure the effect ofpublic protection,
however, the crime rate in the firm's area must be held constant. For
each state it is possible to construct separate crime rates for SMSAs, for
other cities, and for rural areas. Since the property crime rate can have
an independent effect on the firm's decision to hire a quard or protective
service (apart from servinq as a control variable for public protection)
because it is an alternative way of measuririq a firm's e I include only
burqlarv, robbery, and larceny in the construction of the crime variable.
Then for the.th
firm the value of the local crime rate (CRIME) is the
number of burglaries, robberies and larcenies per 100,000 inhabitants in
28From U.S. Department ofCommerce, Bureau of the Census, "Covernment
Finances in 1967—68," GF68, No. 5.—33—
areas in the
.th
firm's state which are similar in size to the
.thfirm's
locality in that state.29
4.Price andnroductiviyvariables
Thereal waqe of private guards (CDI) is measured by the ratio of the
medianearnings of male full-time employed guards and watchmen in the state
inwhich the firmis located to a once index computed from the averaae
hourlyearningsof manufacturing workers in the state.3°
The education of guards is measured by the average number of '7ears of
school completed by male emplored protective service workers in the firm's
state (EDtJC) 3l Since the protective service worker cateory includes
oublic policemen and firemen as well as private guards, the ratio of muards
to all protective service workers in the state is included (PCT) in the
32
regression equation.
29The crime rate data are taken from U.S. Department of Justice, FBI,
Crimein the United_States, 1967 Uniform CrimeReports.
30Median earnings of guards are from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Detailed Characteristics, 1970 Census of Population, Table 175.
Hourly manufacturing wages are from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1970, Table 344. The
index is computed by choosing one state's wage as the numeraire and dividing
all manufacturing wages by this number.
31From U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Detailed
teristics, 1970 Census of Population, Table 179.
32Ibid., Table 170.
S— 34—
Theentrenreneur's experience must be proxied by the nuxrtber of years
the firm has been at its present location (YRS). This variable would he
hiahlv correlated with the aqe of the firm and the firm's aqe would be a
proxy for the owner's experience and hence his productivity as a businessman
and as a nrotector of his firm. There may be a bias due to the possibility of
non-mobile firms being in urban, hich—crime areas. This can be accounted for
by controllina for location in the reciression. A descrintjon of the location
variables is qiven below in number 6.
5. Insurance
The model in Part I treats insurance as an endoaenous variable.
Unfortunately the available data do not enable me to identify a system
of protection and insurance equations and my empirical analysis assumes
that insurance can be used as an indenendent variable in the demand for
quards equation. The firms in the sample indicated whether or not they cur-
rently had burcTlary insurance, robbery or theft insurance, and vandalism in-
surance. Those firms that renorted nositive burqlarv losses also reported
how much the insurance company reimbursed them for their loss.
A dummy variable (ANYINS), which equals one if the firm has any tvne
of insurance and zero if it has none, is used to emnirically examine the
relationship between insurance and protection. Simultaneity may haraner the
estimation of the ANYINS coefficient since if a firm hires a quard it is
able to purchase insurance at a lower rate and would therefore be more likely
to have insurance coverage; a positive coefficient could reflect the influence
of protection on insurance.— 35—
Tjsjnathe dollar amount that the firm was reimbursed by the insur-
ance company after a burglary took place (At1T3INS) should avoid this
problem. Since the reimbursement took olace several months ago, ArITBINS
canhe treated as an exogenous variable referring to an insurance decision
made by the firm in a previous period. GD (PSER) would not have any ef-
fect on AMTBINS as long as the firm did not have a guard (protective
service) at the time it purchased the burglary insurance policy. While
ANTT3INSdoesnot really measure the amount of coverace the firm had since
the loss could have been less than the face value of the nolicy, it does
capture the effect of insurance on reducing the net loss to the firm.
Then if the value of the actual burqlary loss is held constant (BGLOS)
and a dummy variable for the presence of burqlary insurance is also used
(BINS), the coefficient on AMTBINS should be negative since it provides
information for the firm on how much it can exmect to he reimbursed if
future burglary losses occur, Of course, if the firm had a guard (or
protective service) at the time of last year's burglary then it may have
been more likely to have insurance coverage and would therefore report a
larger reimbursement; this would bias the coefficient on N4TBINS towards
zero. Note that the testing of AMTBINS can only be done on the subset
of firms that had positive burglary losses.
6. Other variables
Some other variables not specified in equation (11) are also added.
They are as follows:
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REC:Annual gross receipts in thousands of dollars.
REC2: Square of annual receipts.
URB:Dummyvariable whiöh equals one ifthe firm is
located in a metropolitan area of 50,000 or
more but not in a suburb; zero otherwise.
GilT: Dummy variable which equals one if the firm
is located in a ghetto in a city of 50,000
or more; zero otherwise.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEMAND FOR Pi)TECTI0N
Sincedummy dependentvariables areused to test equation(11) a
33 dichotomouslogit function must be employed. The logit model, which
is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood, specifies the prob-




where X. is a vector of exogenous variables. Tables 3 and 4 contain the
results of the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (21) using GD
33A linear probability function cannot be employed because the usual
tests of a significance of the estimated coefficients cannot be used;
predicted values of some observations may lie outside the zero to one
range since a linear function is unbounded, and the residuals are not
homoskedastic. The logit function avoids these problems.— 37—
andPSER as the dependent variables. Analyzing these two tables simulta—
neously facilitates a comparison of the factors that determine the hiring
of a security guard and the subscription to a protective service. Insur-
ance variables are excluded from the regression in Tables 3and4;since
theirinclusion in the equation did not affect the other variables the
effect of insurance on the demand for protection is discussed later.
A. Endowed Loss, Endowment Probability, and the Effect
of Protective Devices on the Probability of a Loss
1. Endowed loss
In Tables 3 and 4 the firm's endowed loss is estimated by LOSS,the
mean loss of other firms as described in Part II. Regressions 3.1, 3.2,
3.4and4.1, 4.2, 4.4usethe industry groupingmethod. LOSS1 hasa
positiveand significant34 effect in all the equations. When size of
firm and location are not held constant, an increase of $1,000 in the
endowed loss makes the firm 32 per cent more likely to hire a guard and
26 per cent more likely to subscribe to a protective service.35 When
size and location are held constant the partial effect of LOSS1 is re-
duced because size and location are used in the construction of the
34The significance level in regressions 3.2 and 3.4 is 12per cent.
35These effects are computed by using themean probability of hiring
a guard which is .059 and the mean probability of subscribing to a
protective service which is .069.— 38—
TABLE3
Maximum Likelihood LOGIT Regressions
Dependent Variable GD (N =1876)
(Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)














































































































































































Maximum Likelihood LOGIT Regressions
Dependent Variable PSER (N =1896)
(Asymptotic t—ratios in parentheses)













































177.58 190.52 150.32— 40—
endowedloss variable. From regressions 3.2 and 4.2, a $1,000 increase in
the endowed loss results in the firm being 14 per cent more likely to hire
a guard and 16 per cent more likely to subscribe to a protective service.
When the endowed loss is estimated via the regional method in regressions
3.3 and 4.3 its effect is, as predicted, much smaller than that of the
industry loss and, moreover, the effect is not significant. An increase
of $1,000 in the regional endowed loss, not holding size and location
constant, makes the firm only 13 per cent more likely to hire a guard and
10 per cent more likely to subscribe to a protective service; these ef-
fects are about two—fifths the size of the industry loss effects.
2. Endowment probability
In Tables 3 and 4 the firm's endowment probability is estimated by
PROB, the incidence of crime among "similar" firms. As shown in (19) the
coefficients on PROB overestimate the true effects of the endowment prob-
ability. Choosing values for y within the acceptable range
0 <1+yAVG <1enables one to compute the true effects. The largest
acceptable value for y under the industry grouping method is-.0011
while for the regional method it is f—.0022. For comparative purposes,
the value -.001is used to compute all the estimated effects of the
endowment probability.
When size and location are not held constant an increase of ten
percentage points in the industry e (PROB') makes the firm 20 per cent
more likely to hire a guard and 29 per cent more likely to subscribe to— 41—
aprotective service. Holding size and location constant the effects are
reduced to 14 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively. All of these co-
efficients are significant. Using the regional method to measure the
endowment probability, with size and location not held constant, we find
that an increase of ten percentage points in makes the firm 29 per
cent more likely to hire a guard and 34 per cent more likely to sub-
scribe to a protective service. As predicted in Part II the regional
probability is a better measure of e than the industry probability but
both still havesignificant effects on the firm's protection decisions.
Unlike the results for the endowed loss, both industry and region are
important determinants of the firm's endowment probability.
3. Effect of protective devices on reducing
the probability of a loss
As predicted by equation (18) in Part II, the coefficients on AVG
have positive and significant effects on the probability that the firm
hires a guard and on the probability that it subscribes to a protective
service. The ratio of the coefficient on AVG to the coefficient on PROB
is an estimate of A which is that portion of the effect of protection
expenditures on the probability of a loss,measured across cells, that is
independent of e (see equation (15) in Part II]. Table 5 shows the
estimates of A from Tables 3 and 4, the estimates of ,andthe full ef-
fect of protection on the probability of a loss when I =— .001and
is computed as in equation (16). It should be emphasized that B reflects
the reduction in p due to expenditures on protective devices.
S— 42—
FromTable 5 we find, using the industry method,that if afirm that
has already made outlays of $79 on protective devices (the mean AVG1)
spends one more dollar on a device it can reduce its probability of a
loss by approximately .0015. Ignoring diminishing marginal productivity,
an expenditure of $100 would reduce the probability by fifteen percentage
points. With the regional method, however, an expenditure of $100 is
estimated to reduce the probability of a loss by only ten percentage
points. The regional effects are smaller because of the strong positive
correlation (p =.61)between PROB' and AVG1. While the theory predicts
that an increase in protection expenditures reduces the probability of
a loss, i.e. A is negative, I have measured A across regional groups,
and across groups the higher the probability the higher will be protec-
tion expenditures in that group. This is similar to the problem of
estimating the effect of public protection expenditures on crime rates
in a cross-section of states. While protection expenditures reduce
crime, if crime is high expenditures will be high, thus resulting in a
positive correlation. A positive bias therefore exists in the estimation
of A withthe regional method. Since thecorrelation between PROB' and
AVG'is only .28 larger absolute valuesfor A areestimated with the
industry method.
4.Elasticityof Le vs. elasticity of
Table6 summarizes the elasticities of GD and PSER with respect to
the endowed loss and the endowment probability which are measured by the
loss experience of other firms. The probability elasticity is computed— 43—
TABLE5
Estimated Effects of Protective Devices on Reducing
the Probability of a Loss
















10.1 .23 1.07 2.75
10.2 .10 .73 1.98
10.3 .09 1.38 3.91
11.1 .19 1.48 4.77
11.2 .11 1.27 4.07
11.3 .08 1.60 4.75— 45—
atthe mean e36 In all the regressions is significantly larger than
CLe. As indicated in Part I (see footnote 19) this result can be con-
sistent with our original assumption that firms act as if they are risk
neutral or risk averse.
5. The firm's own loss experience
In Table 7 the estimates of the endowed loss and the endowment prob-
ability are modified to consider the influence of the firm's own loss
experience in the previous twelve months. While RELDEV is statistically
significant in both regressions 7.1 and 7.3 its economic significance is
minimal. If a firm had a loss that was 50 per cent above the mean loss
of the group then it is only about 5 per cent more likely to hire a guard
and 6 per cent more likely to subscribe to a protective service. These
small effects could be due to one or both of the following:(1) Simul-
taneity exists since a firm that currently has a guard (protective service)
may also have had him last year and this firm would therefore be very
likely to have reported zero or very low losses for the year.(2) The
firm does not consider the value of its own loss a good estimate of the
value of future losses. By averaging the losses incurred by similar firms
36 eb1 b1PROB -AAVG
CGD, p =— p=— — .Theobserved coefficient
GD GDl+yAVG
on PROB is ——SOin order not to understate the elasticity the
1 +yAVG
quantity -AAVGmust be added to PROB.
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TABLE7
LOGIT Regressions Analyzing the Effects of the Firm's OwnLossHistory
(Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
GD PSER
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4



























































































































126.95 139.86 195.49 207.62— 47—
thisparticular firm obtains a less stochastic estimate of its endowed S
loss.
One way to test these alternative hypotheses is to include the
dummy variable POSLOS in the estimate of the endowment probability as
is done in regressions 7.2 and 7.4. These regressions indicate that if
a firm had a loss last year it is 88 per cent more likely to hire a
guard now and 84 per cent more likely to currently subscribe to a pro-
tective service.37 Obviously even if simultaneity is present it does
not affect the strong positive influence of the firm's having been
victimized. But the dollar loss that the firm incurred has no effect
in regressions 7.2 and 7.4 since RELDEV is not significant there.
This indicates that the absolute value of the loss incurred last year
is not a good estimate of the firm's future loss but the mere occurrence
of the crime is an important determinant of the firm's endowment prob-
ability.
38
(POSLOS* L —LOSS1) Sincewe have GD =a+bPOSLOS +b +
1 2
LOSS'
whereL is the dollar loss for those firms with a loss, the full effect
b
of POSLOS is b +
2L
LOSS1
381n regression 7.2, PROB1 is no lonqer significant. This could be due
to its correlation with POSLOS which is .4. However in regression 7.4,
PROB' is still quite significant. Since RELDEV is not 4gnificant in
reqressions 7.2 and 7.4 and RELDEV is a funrtion of LOSS',theeffects of
LOSS'inthese regressions are not significant. Because RELDEV adds
nothing to the regressions, however, the true effects ofLOSS1 should not
be reduced by addinq an insignificant coefficient.
.— 48—
B.Public Expenditures and Crime Rates
1. Public expenditures
The true effect of public protection expenditures on the demand for
private guards and protective services can only be measured if the crime
rate is held constant as is done in regressions 3.4 and 4.4. These
regressions indicate a public expenditure elasticity of -.32 for GD and
—.43for PSER. The relatively larger and more significant effect for
PSER can be explained by the different nature of the tasks that the two
types of security personnel perform. A quard can work as a night watch-
man and thereby reduce the probability of burglary and vandalism. Or he
may be assigned to work inside the store or plant in order to protect
against shoplifting and employee theft. In the latter role his substitu-
tability with public policemen is almost nil since he performs a task that
could not possibly be performed by the policeman on the beat. A protec-
tive service, however, acts in a very similar capacity to that of
public policemen since it patrols outside the store, and therefore its
primary responsibility is to reduce the occurrence of burglary and/or
vandalism.
However, even though CRIME is held constant, PUB is not really
significant in either regression 3.4 or 4439 A possible explanation
of these coefficients could be that the level of per capita public
have also used the number of policemen per capita to measure pub-
lic protection and its effects were insignificant. See Bartel (1974).— 49—
expendituresor the number of policemen per capita does not correctly
measure the amount of public protection the firm receives. This prob-
lem was documented in a recent study of the police forces in several
40
large cities. For example, the study found that although the New
York City police force increased by 20,000 men over the last two
decades, or from 1.39 policemen per 1,000 inhabitants to 3.92 police-
men per 1,000 inhabitants, the number of police officers actually out
on patrol remained constant over the same period. Similar disparities
were reported in other large cities. To the extent that time series
coefficients and cross—sectional coefficients are comparable, this
phenomenon can explain why a firm will not necessarily reduce its
level of private protection when public expenditures increase.
2. Crime rates
The coefficients on CRIME are noticeably different in regressions
3.4 and 4.4. CRIME has no effect on the probability that the firm will
hire a guard but it has a positive and significant effect on the prob-
ability that it will subscribe to a protective service. There are two
reasons for these diverse coefficients. First, since only a fraction
of the total property crime rate (about 43 per cent of burglary,
40See David Burnham, "1,000 of the City's 31,000 Policemen Are Out
in Radio Cars at Any One Time," The New York Times, February 18, 1974
for a description of the survey's findings.
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25per cent of robbery, 10 per cent oflarceny)41 refers to crimes against
business, firms would not use CRIME as a very reliable measure of their
ownendowmentprobabi].ity.42 A firm would not be willing to commit itself
to the employment of a full-time guard based on imperfect information but
it may be morewilling to make a small outlay in theform of a subscription
toa protective service. Second, since CRIME primarily measures crimes
against non—businesses, household demand for protection will rise when
CRIME rises. One type of protection households could seek is that pro-
vided by a protective service and a substantial household demand for this
service could facilitate a firm's subscription to it. If a private patrol
car will be dispatched to police a neighborhood only if there are a cer-
tain number of subscribers in that neighborhood then an increase in crime
against both residences and businesses would enable them to agree on the
hiring of a protective service for their neighborhood.
C. Size of Firm
Evaluating the effect of REC at its mean value, we find from regres-
sions 3.2 and 4.2 that a firm with gross sales of approximately $1.5
41These percentages are based on information contained in Table 18 of
the 1967 Uniform Crime Reports. This residence/business breakdown was
only done for 673 cities with a population of at least 25,000 but the
figures can serve as general guidelines for the U.S. as a whole.
421n fact, the elasticity of PSER withrespect to CRIME is only .66
while the elasticity with respect to PROB' (evaluated at e) in regres-
sion 4.4 is 1.26.— 51—
millionwould be 38 per cent more likely to hire a guard than one with
gross sales of $1/2 million but it would only be 28 per cent more likely
to subscribe to a protective service. Even though LOSS and PROB are held
constant in the regression and REC is used to construct these variables,
REC still has a positive effect because REC is only stratified into three
groups to compute LOSS and PROB. The coefficient on REC reflects the
complete size variation and thus the influence of size on dollar losses.
The theoretical model predicted, however, that small firms would be more
likely to subscribe to protective services since they expect a smaller
loss (everything else held constant) and would not require their own
guard. Although REC has a positive and significant effect on PSER, the
effect is 35 per cent smaller than the effect of REC on the demand for
guards; this would be consistent with the theoretical prediction.
D. Location of Firm
The effect of being in an urban area and/or in a ghetto can be
analyzed as follows: Since ghetto firms must be in urban areas, the
ghetto dummy is actually an interaction term, i.e.
P. =a+b URB+b URB*GHT+ .... (22)
1 2
Then the effect of being in an urban area is
= + b2GIlT (23)
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andthe effect of being in a ghetto is
::= b2 (24)
Therefore, b1 measures the effect of being in an urban nonghetto area
versus a nonurban area; b2 measures the effect of being in a ghetto
versus an urban nonghetto area; and (b1 +b2)is the effect of being in
a ghetto versus a nonurban area. From regressions 3.4 and 4.4 where
CRIME is held constant we find that (1) ghetto firms are more likely to
hire both guards and protective services than are nonurban firms; (2)
ghetto firms are more likely to subscribe to protective services than
are urban nonghetto firms but they are not more likely to hire guards;
and (3) urban nonqhetto firms are more likely to hire guards than are
nonurban firms but they are not more likely to subscribe to protective
services.
Ghetto firms are more likely to hire both guards and protective
services than are nonurban firms because they face higher endowment
probabilities and higher endowed losses from crime. This effect is
i i i not picked up in the LOSS and PROB coefficients because LOSS and
PROB' only distinguish between urban and nonurban firms without any
special provision for ghetto firms; and ghetto firms have significantly
higher endowment probabilities than urban nonghetto firms.43 The
43From Table 10, regression 10.3, we see that ghetto firms are 73
per cent more likely to incur a loss than urban nonghetto firms.
However when the sante equation is run just on those firms with a loss
and the dollar value of the loss is used as the dependent variable,
GilT is not significant.— 53—
magnitudeof (b1 + b2) is about the same in both equations; ghetto firms
are 70 per cent more likely to hire guards and 78 per cent more likely
to subscribe to protective services than are nonurban firms.
The fact that ghetto firms are more likely to subscribe to protec-
tive services but not more likely to hire guards than are urban nonghetto
firms is due to the size distribution of surroundina firms. Ghetto
firms are more homogenous in size than urban nonghetto firms.44 A small
ghetto firm has many other small firms in its neighborhood that also need
protection but whose size precludes them from hiring their own guard;
these firms would be anxious to subscribe to a protective service that
could patrol the entire area. The small urban nonghetto firm, on the
other hand, does not necessarily have many other small firms nearby with
whom it could hire a protective service; it is not unusual, for example,
for a small retailer to be located on the same block with many large
department stores that hire their own full-time guards.
The reason that urban nonghetto firms are more likely to hire guards
but not more likely to hire protective services than are nonurban firms
relates to the urban nonghetto firm's higher probability of employee
44The standard deviation of REC for ghetto firms is 339,380 and the
coefficient of variation is 2.1. The standard deviation for urban non—
ghetto firms is 2,753,558 and the coefficient of variation is 3.
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theft.45When CRIMEisnot held constant (see regressions 3.2 and 4.2),
URBissignificant for both forms of protection; obviously LOSS'and
PROB! do not completely capture the urban firm's vulnerability to crime.
The addition of CRIME provides more information on the urban firm's
probability of external theft (i.e. burglary, vandalism, robbery) and
thereby weakens the urban dummy in both regressions 3.4 and 4.4. How-
ever, CRIME does not measure employee theft and PROB measures the prob-
ability of crime, not specifically employee theft. URB therefore
captures the higher incidence of employee theft among urban nonghetto
firms than nonurban firms and the demand for guards among urban non—
ghetto firms will rise; since protective services do not affect em-
ployee theft URB is insignificant in regression 4.4.
E. Other Independent Variables in Tables 3 and 4
GDI is negative and significant in all the regressions in Table 3
because of the own price effect. While it is negative in all the
regressions in Table 4 it is not significant there and this is prob-
ably due to the Census category, "guards and watchmen," which was
used. Protective services are more properly classified as private
patrolmen but in the Census the wage rates of private patrolmen are
45The observed probability of employee theft among urban nonghetto
firms is .081 while for nonurban firms it is .056. These numbers are
significantly different from one another at the 10 per cent level of
significance.— 55—
indistinguishablefrom those of public patrolmen.46 The inappropriate-
ness of GDI for protective services would therefore account for the
insignificant coefficients.
EDUC is never significant in any of the regressions in Tables 3
and 4. This implies that education does not increase the productivity
of guards and protective services. An alternative explanation of the
insignificant coefficient is that since EDUC is highly correlated with
the deflator used for GDI (P =.7)the deflator could in part be pick-
ing up the positive effect ofEDUC.47 The problem arises from the fact
that the deflator is a wage, not a price index, and it therefore picks
up productivity effects due to educationacross statesthe education
of manufacturing workers would be highly correlated with the education
of guards.
STK is positive and significant in all regressions. This cannot
be interpreted as evidence of complimentarity between protective
devices and security personnel since the output of these factors of
production (they produce l-p) is not being held constant; PROB only
46While the guards and watchmen category also contains public guards,
68 per cent of the category are private guards, and, in fact, many
"public" guards can really be treated as private security workers since
they do not have public peace officer powers. In the policemen category,
however, 96 per cent of the workers are public policemen.
47When the wage rate of guards is not deflated by the index, EDUC is
significant. See Appendix D in Bartel (1974). However, this is not the
correct way to measure the price of guards and one can therefore not
rely on the EDUC coefficient from this regression. A state price index
is required for the proper estimation of these coefficients.
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holdsthe endowment probability constant. The positive sign maymerely
reflect a scale effect, i.e. a movement from isoquant to isoquant rather
than a movementalong a given isoquant.
Holding CRIME,URB, and GHT constant in regressions 3.4 and 4.4,
YRS has a positive but insignificant effect on the demand for guards
and a negative and almost significant effect on the demand for protec-
tive services. This indicates that an increase in the experience of
the entrepreneur raises his "output" productivity more than his "pro-
tection" productivity, and he reduces his time spent in protection.
He is then somewhat more likely to hire a guard but less likely to hire
a protective service because guards and entrepreneurial policing time
are, on balance, substitutes, while protective services and entrepre-
neurial time, are, on balance, complements (seefoothote 17). The
substitutabilitybetween guards and the entrepreneur occurs because
they both operate inside the store (e.g. policing customers and employees)
or on the immediate grounds (e.g. checking gates to thwart burglars or
vandals). A protective service acts as a complement to the entrepre-
neur's policing time because (1) by patrolling outside during the day it
frees the entrepreneur to more effectively police his employees and cus-
tomers inside and (2) since private patrol cars also respond to alarms
(triggered by burglars) that ring either inside the car or at the dis-
patch center the entrepreneur's time is required to maintain the effi—
ciency of the alarm system (i.e. he must periodically check to see if it
is working).— 57—
F.The Relationship Between Protection and Insurance
Table 8 contains coefficients for the two insurance variables,
ANYINS and AMTBINS, each of which was added to the GD and PSER regres-
sions. Both coefficients on the dummy variable ANYINS are positive
and significant. Firms with insurance are 60 per cent more likely to










This is a clear rebuttal of the moral hazard argument; of course the
causality could be in the opposite direction since a firm may have hired
a guard (protective service) in order to be able to purchase insurance.
When the continuous variable, ANTBINS, is used, insurance has no
effect on GD and PSER. The relationship between protection and the price
of insurance that was the basis for the positive signs on ANYINS no longer
exists because ANTBINS refers to last year's insurance. The more the
.— 58—
firmwas reimbursed last year the lower its expected net loss this year48
and hence the smaller its demand for guards and protective services. The
absence of significantly negative coefficients on AMTBINS is probably due
to serial correlation in the dependent variable (see discussion on paqe
35).
Table 9 contains coefficients for ANYINS which were obtained from
separate regressions run on urban and nonurban firms. For both dependent
variables, the positive effect of insurance is much larger for nonurban
firmsthan forurban firms. Nonurban firms with insuranceare 82per cent
morelikelyto hire guards than nonurban firms without insurance while
urban firms with insurance are only 33 per cent more likely to hire guards
than urban firms without insurance. Similarly, nonurban firms with in-
surance are 69 per cent more likely to subscribe to protective services
than nonurban firms without insurance while urban firms with insurance are
only 28 per cent more likely to subscribe to protective services than
urban firms without insurance.
48Note that a dummy variable for the presence of burglaryinsurance is
includedin these two regressions so that AMTBINS is a proxy for the firm's
burglary insurance reimbursement this year.— 59—
.
TABLE9
Effects of Insurance for Urban and Nonurban Firms
Urban Nonurban
Coefficient Relative Coefficient Relative
(t—ratio) Effect (t—ratio) Effect
GD .3536D—0l 33% .2951D—0l 82%
(1.00) (2.04)
PSER .3622D—0l 28% .2779D—Ol 69%
(.94) (1.82)
These differential effects for urban and nonurban firms can be ex-
plained by the fact that urban insurance would tend to be less fair than
insurance in nonurban areas. This is because the higher incidence of
crime in urban areas would make the provision of insurance more costly,
i.e. processing and administrative costs would increase as the probability
of crime increased. The more fair the insurance is, the stronger the
complementary relationship between insurance and protection because the
firm is able to qet a larger benefit (in terms of a premium reduction)
from the reduction in the probability of a loss. When insurance is
actuarially fair, the firm gets the full benefit from protection.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE INCIDENCE OF CRIME AGAINST BUSINESS
This article has been concerned with analyzing the determinants of
the demand for private protection manpower. The Small Business Adminis-
tration data also make it possible, however, to analyze the factors that
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determinewhich firms will incur a loss from crime in a twelve—month period.
In order to conduct such an analysis several new variables are defined as
follows:
SOUTH: Dummy variable which equals one if the firm
is located in the South; zero otherwise.
NW: Dummy variable which equals one if the firm





A. Determinants of the Incidence of Crime
Table 10 contains LOGIT regressionson the dummy dependent variable
POSLOS. The firm's total expenditures on protective devices, STK, are
held constant so that the regression can measure the partial effects of
the exogenous variables on the probability of victimization. It is
possible, however, that STK may contain some recent expenditures for
devices that were not present on the date that the crime occurred and
the firm may, in fact, have purchased the devices in response to this
per cent of the respondents to the SBA questionnaire were black.
89per cent of this group were the owners of the firmsand only 11 per
cent were managers. Therefore NWbasically measures black ownership.— 61—
TABLE10
LOGIT Regressions on the Probability of Victimization
Dependent Variable is POSLOS
(Asymptotict-ratios in parentheses) N =1941




























































































x2 110.92 90.74 112.77
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crime;this would result in a simultaneous relationship. Since STK does
include past expenditures it is a better control for the level of pro-
tection in the previous twelve—month period than is GD or PSER since
we cannot be sure that a firm which had a quard on the interview date
also had him twelve months ago; simultaneity would be a more severe
problem with the latter variables.
1. Size of firm
Even when protection expenditures and location are held constant,
large firms are more likely to incur losses than are small firms. The
elasticity, however, is only .10; a firm with qross sales of $1 million
is 10 per cent more likely to incur a loss than a firm with gross sales
of $1/2 million. This sales effect could be due to one or more of the
following:(1) the entrepreneur's efficiency in policing his firm de-
clines as firm size increases; (2) small firms may be less likely to
report a loss for fear of being branded a poor credit risk; large firms
often have internal sources of funds and they would therefore have less
to lose from the reporting of a crime; (3) criminals find larger firms
to be more attractive targets.
2. Location and region
Urban nonghetto firms are 21 per cent more likely to be victimized
than are nonurban firms while ghetto firms are 94 per cent more likely
to incur a loss than are nonurban firms. Moreover, ghetto firms are
73 per cent more likely to incur a loss than are urban nonghetto firms.— 63—
Theregional dummy, SOUTH, has a negative and significant effect;
Southern firms are 14 per cent less likely to be victimized thanfirms
in other regions. This is because the South has a smaller supplyof
property criminals than the other regions since illegalopportunities
are lower in theSouth.5° Even though CRIME is held constant the
significance of SOUTH indicates that CRIME is an underestimateof the
true rate of criminaloffenses51 or at least of the true rate of
offenses aqairist firms.
3. Race of owner
The racial characteristics of the firm may affect its probability
of property crime victimization. Since blacks have lower legal opportu-
nities than whites the proportion of property offenders amongthe black
population should be greater than the proportion amongwhites. Also
firms owned by blacks tend to be located in areas that are predominantly
50Median family income in the South is $8,079 while in the non—South it
is $10,200.(Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
General Social and Economic CharacteristicS, 1970 Census of Population,
Table 135). I. Ehrlich (1973) has used this variable as a measureof
illegal payoffs in order to predict the rate of crime acrossstates.
51The fact that the Uniform Crime Reports data understate the true
crime rate has been documented by surveys currently beingcarried out
by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.See David Burnhaxfl,
"Federal Surveys to Gauge Crime Levels in Big Cities," The NewYork
Times,January 27, 1974, p. 1 for a description of these surveys.
Preliminary results from the surveys indicate that the truecrime rate
is at least twice that of the rate reported in the UniformCrime Reports.
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black.Therefore, these firms would be close to a greater Supply of crim-
inal offenders than firms owned by whites. The dummy variable for owner-
ship by a black, NW, is not significant, however, when GHT is held constant.
This is because GHT measures the firm's proximity to a greater supply of
criminal offenders. When GHT is dropped from the equation, as in regres-
sion 10.2, nonwhite firms are 27 per cent more likely to be victimized
than are white firms.
4. Public expenditures and crime rates
Even when CRIME is held constant PUB has no effect on whether or not
the firm is victimized. In Part III, although the coefficients were not
significant, PUB had a negative effect on the demand for guards and pro-
tective services with an elasticity ranging from -.32 to —.43. This
effect was said to be due to either a reduction in the firm's probability
of victimization and/or a reduction in the marginal product of private
security manpower. Since PUB has no effect on POSLOS in Table 10 this
implies that the negative coefficients in Part III were due to the
marginal product effect.
CRIME has a positive effect (significance level is 17 per cent) on
the firm's probability of victimization. In areas where the overall
crime rate is high a firm is more likely to be victimized because it
faces a greater supply of criminal offenders.— 65—
5.Protection expenditures
STK was used in the regression as a control for the amount of pro-
tection the firm had when the loss took place. STK should have a nega-
tive sign since, everything else constant, an increase in protection
results in a decrease in the probability of victimization. In all the
regressions in Table 10, however, STK has a positive coefficient. This
is due to simultaneity; after the firm incurred a loss it added to its
stock of protection. Part of the simultaneity, however, is indirect.52
6. Years at present location
In regressions 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3, YRS has a positive and signifi-
cant effect. One possible explanation is that firms that have been at
their present location for a long time tend to be located in high—crime
areas. The true effect of YRS would be dependent upon the firm's being
located in an urban area or a ghetto and the regresssion requires inter-
action terms between YRS and UPS and between YRS and GHT, i.e.
521fl Part III we saw that STK had a positive and significant effect on
both GD and PSER. Moreover, POSLOS also had a positive and significant
effect, i.e. firms that incurred a loss during the previous twelve
months were more likely to have guards and/or protective services at the
time of the interview. To show that the positive and significant co-
efficients on STK in Table 10 are due to the above relationships, I
added a dummy variable, GDSER, which equals one if the firm has a guard
or protective service,to the regression. The result was that the co-
efficient on STK was reduced by 42 per cent and was no longer signifi-
cant. See Bartel (1974), Table 25.
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POSLOS=a+ b1 YRS +b2URB+b3 GHT
(25)
+ b4 YRSURB + b5 YRSGHT +
The true effect of YEScanbe written as:
aPOSLOS=
b1
+ b4 URB + GHT (26)
According to this hypothesis, b1 should be insignificant and b4 and b5
should be positive and significant; YES would be a proxy for the Un-
desirableness of a neighborhood given that the firm is in an urban (and
ghetto) area. This hypothesis is tested in regression 10.4. The co-
efficient on YES is still significant while the coefficients on YRSURB
and YRSGHT are not significant. Even if a firm is in a nonurban area
the longer it has been at its present location the more likely it is to
have been victimized. The fact that "old" firms are more likely to be
victimized than "young" firms is unrelated to the location of the firm.53
The most reasonable explanation of the YES coefficient is one or both
of the following. One, firms that have been at their present location for
longer periods of time are in old buildings that are most vulnerable to
53Moreover, even if we look just at the set of nonurban firms, i.e. let
GUT =URB=YRSGHT=YRSURB=0,the positive effect of YEScannotbe
attributed to crime in the area, because the youngest of the nonurban firms,
i.e. those in the suburbs (mean values for YES is 10.6 years for suburban
firms and 15.1 years for other nonurban firms), would have the highest
crime rates since they are closest to the urban areas and a large supply
of criminals.— 67—
crime.In other words, YRS measures the private protection level inherent
in the physical plant, e.g. special lighting and display cases, more dur-
able doors and windows, etc. These forms of protection would not show
up in the expenditure variable, STK, since that variable only includes
alarms, locks, and gates. Young firms, would, on average, be in newer
buildings which would have been built with more of a concern for crime
deterrence than older buildings. Two, YRS proxies the experience of
the entrepreneur both in producing his output and protecting his firm.
The regression results indicate that even if the entrepreneur becomes
more efficient over time in self-protection, he becomes relatively more
efficient in output production arid therefore reduces his time spent in
self-protection. This reduction is so large that it outweighs the
original absolute increase in protection productivity.
B. Comparison of Incidence Results to an
Analysis of Household Victimization
My analysis of the determinants of the incidence of crime among firms
can be readily compared to Neil Komesar's study (1973) on the factors
affecting the incidence of household burglary. Komesar's important find-
ings were that family income has a positive but insignificant effect on
victimization; nonwhite families are more likely to be victimized;
distance from the center city has a negative and significant effect; a
dummy for the Southern region is also negative and significant; and
families whose head is older are less likely to be victimized.
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Theseresults are generally consistent with my analysis of the
victimization of firms. Although aross sales had a statistically
significant effect in Table 10, the elasticity was only .10 which is
a relatively minor effect. NW was not significant when I held GHT
constant and Komesar's significant coefficient is probably due to his
inability to control for location in a ghetto. Nonurban firms, like
nonurban households, are less likely to be victimized. Also, firms
located in the South are less likely to be victimized as are house-
holds located in the South. Komesar's negative coefficient on age
was explained by his argument that older heads are more efficient in
self—protecting and that they spend more time at home (a taste effect)
which is a form of self-protection. The time at home argument is of
course not relevant for firms. My results for YRS are consistent with
the entrepreneur, like the family head, becoming more productive in
self-protection, but another factor is at work. The entrepreneur be-
comes relatively more productive in output production and he then re-
duces his time in self—protection so much that this outweighs the
original increase in his protection efficiency.
CONCLUSION
Before answering the three questions posed in the introduction to
this article it should be reiterated here that the analysis was able to
document the fact that protection expenditures reduce the incidence of
crime against firms. It was shown that if the average firm spent one— 69—
moredollar on protective devices its probability of a loss would fall by
.0015; a $100 expenditure would result in a drop of 15 percentage points.
The answers to our three main questions regarding the private sector's
demand for protection can be stated as follows:
One, firms respond rationally to real economic forces in making their
protection decisions in that they are strongly influenced by increases in
both the probability of a crime and the loss incurred from that crime.
Firms place relatively more weight on the probability of a loss occurring
rather than on the size of the anticipated loss. This implies that if
criminals were to become more efficient, i.e. more able to steal larger
amounts, firms would not react as strongly to this as they would to a
general increase in the number of criminal incidents.
Two, an increase in per capita public protection expenditures (or
in the number of policemen per capita) will reduce the demand for pri-
vate security manpower, but this negative effect is not significant.
A strong negative effect is dependent upon the proper allocation of the
increased public expenditures and public manpower. In the last decade
much of the increased public spending has been used to hire some police-
men to expand office staffs and to reduce working hours rather than to
increase police patrols. To the extent that a coefficient from a cross—
sectional analysis is a good predictor of a time—series coefficient, it
is therefore not surprising that a strong negative impact of public
spending on private guards and protective services is not estimated here.
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Three,insurance is not being used as a substitute for private pro-
tection. Rather, firms are hiring guards or protective services in
order to be able to purchase insurance at lower prices. Giving a firm
the option to purchase insurance actually makes protection expenditures
a more attractive investment. The federal crime insurance programs that
are designed to supply insurance to firms in high—crime areas also re-
inforce this complementary relationship since they have established
stringent protective device requirements for the applicants.References .
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